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TAXATION OF TRANSFERS INTENDED TO TAIE EFFECT
AT THE TRANSFEROR'S DEATH
The possibilities for evasion of statutes imposing taxes on de-
cedents' estates through the creation intcr vi'os of future in-
terests in such estates produced the common statutory provision
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that transfers "taking effect in possession or enjoyment at the
death of the transferor" are taxable in like manner as decedents'
estates. The statutes seem to state a simple criterion of taxability,
but in particular cases it is often difficult of application. Take
the case most obviously within the statute: that of the creation
in a grantee of a vested remainder in land after a life estate in
the grantor. Such a transfer is indubitably taxable;1 yet it is
clear that in one respect at least the grantee's estate vests in
enjoyment immediately. He has the power to dispose immediately
of his future estate. This power is economically valuable and
unquestionably is one of the "rights" of enjoyment of land as
ordinarily understood. It is clear, therefore, that in order to
escape taxation the vesting of something more than this single
"right" of enjoyment is requisite. How much more? Is the vest-
ing of all the rights of enjoyment necessary? It seems not, for
we need change the facts of our hypothetical case only very
slightly to escape the statute. Thus if the deed contain a cov-
enant on the part of the grantor to pay a reasonable rent for the
life estate reserved, there will be no doubt that the transfer is
not taxable.2 Yet the enjoyment of the land is still divided be-
tween the grantor and grantee, with most of the rights with
respect to the land still in the grantor. It would seem, therefore,
that such statutes require the present vesting in the grantee of
some minimum complex of rights, but less than all possible, to
take the transfer out of the statute. What that minimum is can
be discovered only by a careful examination of the cases.
What of the alternative requirement of vesting in possession?
It is submitted that this requirement might as well have been
omitted from the statute, since the cases it covers are equally
within the alternative provision for taking effect in enjoyment3
Vesting in possession is immaterial if the condition as to vesting
in enjoyment is not met. A single case will demonstrate this
point. Assume a deed creating a present estate in fee in the
grantee, the grantee, however, covenanting to pay a reasonable
rent to the grantor as long as the grantor shall live. Here the
condition as to present vesting in possession is met beyond ques-
tion, and it would seem that the grantee is the one privileged
to enjoy the land; yet the transfer is taxable. It is possible to
regard this case in either of twQ ways. The old view was that
'See Moore v. Bugbee (1925, N. J.) 128 Atl. 679; People v. Tavencr
(1921) 300 Ill. 373, 133 N. E. 211.
2It would thus appear that the transferor retains no interest for which
he is compensated. It has been held that the fact that the transferor
remained in possession by sufferance or permission does not subject the
transfer to taxation. Kelley v. Woolsey (1918) 177 Calif. 325, 170 Pac. 837.
a See People v. Tavener, supra note 1 (the transferee in effect received
possession at once subject to payment of rent to the transferor, and the
transfer was taxed).
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rent is an estate in land, and this view is still possible.4 On this
view the complex of possible rights in the land is divided be-
tween grantor and grantee. To present-day minds this seems
in some measure strained, and probably most courts would say
in such a case that all rights in the land had passed to the grantee
and that the obligation to pay rent was entirely collateral. None
the less they would hold the transfer taxable. It would seem,
therefore, that the real criterion is in the concept "taking effect
in enjoyment" and that that- phrase has reference to something
other than the vesting in the transferee of rights with respect
to the res transferredA
Outright gifts of the entire complex of possible rights with
reference to a physical res or of all the rights constituting an
"intangible" are not taxable. If the transferor reserves for the
period of his life some interest in the res or some of the compo-
nent rights of the "intangible", the courts are compelled to deter-
mine whether the reservation is such as to bring the case within
the statute. In general, privileges of user of physical things and
the right to income in the case of "intangibles" can not be re-
tained without making the transfer a taxable one.7 The power
of disposition and, in case of stock, the "right to vote" may be
retained and yet the transfer will escape the tax, provided the
4 See 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) sec. 403, ct scq.
Cf. People v. Ta vener, suepra, note 1.
It seems likely that in phrasing the statute the framers had in mind a
vested remainder in realty following a life estate. It is customary to speah
of the remainder as vesting, or taking effect, in possession upon the death of
the life tenant. The phrase "taking effect in possession" seemed to describe
this case, and the alternative "or enjoyment" was no doubt added to take
care of "intangibles". In the case of "intangibles" there is, of course, no
identified physical res, the subject matter of the property rights, of which
the transferee may be possessed. But in all cases, whether of land, ehattels,
or "intangibles", it is with the transfer of rights that the statute is con-
cerned. These are, of course, in all cases intangible; so it is not surprising
that the criterion intended only for "intangibles" turns out to be the proper
one in all cases.
7The transfer is taxable when the transferor retains the income.
Crocker v. Shaw (1899) 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549; In re Corncll',: Eatate
(1902) 170 N. Y. 423, 63 N. E. 445; In re Moi's Estate (1904) 207 Ill.
180, 69 N. E. 905; Carter v. Bztgbee (1918) 91 N. J. L. 438, 103 At. 818;
In re Schh's Estate (1923) 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516. The same is true
when the income is reserved to a third person. State Street Trnt Co. v.
Stevens (1911) 209 lass. 373, 95 N. E. 851. The transfer will be taxed
if part of the income goes to the transferor and the rest to third partie .
In re Patterson's Estate (1910, Surro. Ct.) 127 N. Y. Supp. 284; see (1923)
7 MINN. L. REv. 598. Or if part to the transferor and the rest to the
transferee. In re Cruger (1900, 1st Dept.) 54 App. Div. 405, 66 N. Y. Supp.
636; Congregational Society r. Bugbee (1925, N. J.) 127 Atl. 192. It has
been held that when part only of the income has been reserved, only that
part of the fund which is necessary to produce that amount of income will
be taxed. People v. Kelley (1905) 218 Ill. 509, 75 N. E. 1038.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
exercise of these rights is made subject to the scrutiny of a court
of equity;8 that is, provided a trust is declared. In at least one
situation a power of revocation of the interest given may be re-
tained without affecting the immunity from taxation. A transfer
of a res in trust for another is not taxable merely because the
power of revoking the trust is retained. It would seem by
analogy that any transfer would still escape taxation if subject
to defeasance upon any other sort of condition subsequent than
that in the foregoing example.'0
Any of the foregoing retentions that result in taxation may,
however, be made and the transfer, escape taxation if the interest
"taking effect on the death of the. transferor" is transferred for
an adequate consideration." In some jurisdictions transfers for
a consideration are exempted by the statute from taxation,'- but
in many there is no such provision. Judicial construction has,
however, supplied the want where it existed. 13 This brings for-
ward the question as to what will be considered a sufficient con-
sideration. Courts that recognize the possibilities for evasion in
this provision declare that it is not enough to prevent the opera-
tion of the statute that the consideration given would be sufficient
to support a contract. 14  To prevent the transfer from being
taxable the consideration must be adequate to the value of the
8 In re Kountze's Estate (1923, Surro. Ct.) 120 Misc. 289, 198 N. Y. Supp.
442 (transfer of stock in trust not taxable when the power to vote the
stdck and the power to revoke or modify the trust is retained). In the
absence of a trust it has been held that, when the power to vote stock has
been retained, the value of that voting power should be taxed. In re Ferris'
Estate (1923, N. J. Prerog.) 121 Atl. 692.
9 Estate of Masury (1898, 2d Dept.) 28 App. Div. 580, 51 N. Y. Supp.
331; People v. Northern Trust Co. (1919) 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662; In
re Miller's Estate (1923) 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E. 701; see (1923) 71 U.
PA. L. REV. 404. The federal law has taken the opposite view. See Thurber,
Federal Estate Tax (1921) 52. The transfer will be taxed if the trans-
feror retains the power to control the administration of the trust. Matter
of Bostwick (1899) 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208; see Bullen v. Wisconsin
(1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473; (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 671.
10 See In re Wendel's Estate (1917, 2d Dept.) 181 App. Div. 126, 168
N. Y. Supp. 297.
1 It would also appear to be true that a transfer would escape taxation
even though an interest were reserved to the transferor for life, if the
transferor should pay the transferee an adequate consideration for the
interest retained. Such a case does not appear to have been litigated.
12 See jurisdictions listed infra, note 16.
13 See (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1053 and the cases cited therein. It is doubtful
upon whom the burden of showing consideration, or the lack of it, should fall.
See Gleason and Otis, Inheritance Taxation (3d ed. 1922) 156.
14 Crossman v. Regina (1886) 18 Q. B. Div. 256, 263; Attorney General
v. Holden (1903) 1 K. B. 832. See In re Reynold's Estate (1915) 169 Calif.
600, 147 Pac. 268; Re Orvis (1918) 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88. Many state
statutes require that the consideration be adequate in value to the res
transferred for the transfer to escape taxation.
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property transferred. Apparent intent to benefit the transferee
will cause a closer scrutiny of the transaction than would other-
wise be made.15 Some statutes expressly require that there be
a full consideration in money or money's worth.1 American
jurisdictions which do not require a consideration in money or
money's worth hold that marriage is a consideration sufficient to
relieve transfers from tax ;17 but a contrary rule obtains in Eng-
land where there is such a statute.18 When the consideration
given is in the form of services, their value may be ascertained
and if it equals the value of the res transferred there will be no
tax even under a statute requiring the consideration to be in
money or money's worth.19 If property is conveyed upon con-
sideration of life care for the transferor, -  or for a third party,-'
the adequacy of the consideration would seem to depend upon the
transferor's expectation of life. The interest in a joint fund
which passes to the survivor upon the death of one joint tenant
is not taxable if the fund was created by contribution of both.22
A promise to pay back the income actually received from the res
transferred is not such consideration as to prevent the transfer
"s The fact that the transferee is a close relative of the transferor gives
rise to a presumption that a partial gift was intended. See Crosaman v.
Regina, supra note 14.
16 Such are found in California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Kan ac,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
the Federal Act.
'Matter of Baker (1903, 4th Dept.) 83 App. Div. 530, 82 N. Y. Supp.
390; Estate of Craig (1904, 2d Dept.) 97 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y. Supp. 971.
" Floyer v. Bankes (1863, Ch.) 3 De G. J. & S. 300; Re Gyay (1890) 1
Ch. 620; see Fryer v. Morland (1876) 3 Ch. Div. 075, G82. Under the early
acts when there was a consideration of both money and marriage, there was
no exemption for the amount of money paid. Attonicy Gczcral v. Rath-
donnell (1893, Exch.) 32 Ir. R. 574. But later acts permit such an ex-
emption. See Re Lombard [1904] 2 Ir. R. 621.
9 See State Street Trust Co. v. Stezcvzs, supra note 7. When the value
of the services is less than the value of the res transferred, in the absence
of statute there can be no reduction in the tax because of the partial
consideration. It would appear doubtful whether Illinois would subscribe
to this rule. See People v. Kelley, supra note 7.
20 Inadequate: Abstract, Guaranty & Title Co. r. State (1916) 173 Calif.
691, 161 Pac. 264; State Street Trust Co. v. Stevens, supra note 7. Ade-
quate: Re Hess (1906, 4th Dept.) 110 App. Div. 476, 90 N. Y. Supp. 990;
Re Wadsworth (1917, Surro. Ct.) 100 Misc. 439, 100 N. Y. Supp. 710.21People v. Burkhalter (1910) 247 Ill. 600, 93 N. E. 379. If an intent
is apparent from the transaction that the transfer is not to tahe effect
until the death of the transferor of real estate, the transfer will be taxed
though there is a consideration of past care plus a free life lease of the
premises to the transferor. In re Dobson's Estate (1911, Surro. Ct.) 73
Misc. 170, 132 N. Y. Supp. 472.
22 Re Heiser (1913, Surro. Ct.) 85 Misc. 271, 147 N. Y. Supp. 557; At-
torney General v. Clark (1915) 222 lass. 291, 110 N. E. 299. The same
rule does not apply to community property. See Thurber, op. cit. mpra
note 9, at 58. For tenants by the entirety, see (1924) 24 CoL_ L. REv. 209.
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from being taxed.23 Whether an absolute promise to pay period-
ically during the life of the transferor a stipulated sum not
actually received as income from the res transferred will take a
case out of the statute presents a more difficult question; for such
a case seems at first glance indistinguishable from the purchase
of an annuity from an insurance comp5any, which, of course, is
never taxed.
This was the situation confronting a New Jersey court in two
recent cases-In re Harvey's Estate (1924, Prerog.) 129 Atl. 393
and In re Honeyman's Estate (1925, Prerog.) 129 Atl. 393. In
the former, money and land were transferred, the transferor to
have life use of the land and to receive an annual sum equal to
five per cent interest on the money, and the transfer was held sub-
ject to taxation. In the latter, a sum of money was transferred,
the transferee promising to pay a certain sum annually, which
sum actually amounted to six per cent on the sum transferred,
and the transfer was held free from tax. Despite the court's
insistence that in these cases "the question is not of the form but
of the substance of the transaction", it distinguished these cases
which, it is submitted, are without substantial difference. In both
cases the decedent parted with all rights in the money trans-
ferred. In both cases he received in return an absolute promise
to pay a stipulated sum of money-in the one case measured in
dollars, and in the other measured in percentage of the sum
transferred and called "interest". In both cases the promise of
the transferee would have to be performed regardless of what
happened to the res, as to which the transferee was given all the
rights of ownership. The court in In re Honeyman's Estate in-
terprets the New Jersey statute24 as not requiring a consideration
equal in value to the thing transferred in order to free the trans-
fer from taxation2 5 and is thus enabled to reach its conclusion in
that case; but this obviously would not justify the differentiation
made between the two cases. The court's position makes the
New York has held that the mutual promises in a mutual survivorship
agreement do not furnish an adequate consideration. See Re Orvis, supra
note 14.
23 Reish V. Comwnwealth (1884) 106 Pa. 521; but see In re Thorn's
Estate (1899, 2d Dept.) 44 App. Div. 8, 60 N. Y. Supp. 419. It has been
held that an agreenient to pay interest on the par value of stock transferred
is an adequate consideration. Polk v. Miles (1920, D. C. Md.) 268 Fed. 175.
It would seem that this consideration would hardly be adequate to the
,value of the property transferred if the capital value of the stock amounted
to anything; but the facts of the case showed that the company that issued
the stock was a losing venture.
24 (1911) 4 Comp. Stat. N. J. 5301.
25 "It must equally be conceded that a transfer for which consideration
is received by the transferor is not per se taxable under the statute,
whether such consideration be equal to, greater or less than, the value
of the thing transferred". Page 394 of the opinion.
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result turn on the words used in the transfer; and since in such
transfers, if the transferor be well advised, the words will always
be used that will evade taxation, the effect is to provide an easy
means of evasion. It is submitted that both transfers should have
been subject to taxation since the return payments promised in
both cases were no more than reasonable interest on the sums
transferred. It is in this particular that the purchase of an an-
nuity from an insurance company differs from the instant cases
-the insurance company returns annually to the annuitant some-
thing over and above reasonable interest on the sum originally
transferred to it. As such promises are aleatory in their nature,
the extent of the risk involved must be considered in determining
how large must be the sum to be paid in excess of reasonable
interest. Therefore the sum that an individual need promise will
be smaller than that required of an insurance company which is
protected by the large scale of its operations. None the less,
some substantial excess over and above reasonable interest must
be promised or the transfer will be taxable.
In conclusion it would seem that the criterion which particular
cases are marking out is not one having to do with the time of
vesting, either in right or enjoyment,"of property in the thing
transferred. That is immaterial. The important question is who
gets the income- or use-value thereof pending the death of the
transferor. If the transferor gets that value, then the transfer
is taxable if it gives an interest in the res to the transferee that
begins upon the transferor's death or that continues thereafter,
unless that interest is paid for by the transferee.
PRIVTITY AND MUTUALITY IN THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
In Tasin v. Bastress (1925, Pa.) 130 Atl. 417, the defendant
contracted with two promisees to pay six notes, one of the promis-
ees being a maker of one and a co-maker of another of these notes.
The other makers of the various notes were third parties. The
makers of one of these notes sued as third party beneficiaries of
the promise and recovered judgment against the defendant.
Thereafter the makers of the remaining notes, some of whom
had also been among the co-makers of the note in the first suit,
brought separate suits against this same defendant as bene-
ficiaries of his promise. These suits were tried together. It
was held that the issues were res judicatal in those suits where all
1 The court makes no distinction between the operation of a former
judgment as a bar and as an estoppel. It is usually said that a former
judgment operates as an absolute bar to any further litigation of the
same "right of action" and is conclusive of all points raised, or which
might have been raised; but that when a different right of action is in issue
the former judgment operates as an estoppel upon only those points in
controversy which were actually decided by the prior finding or verdict.
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the parties plaintiff had been parties to the previous litigation,
i.e., had been among the co-makers of the note in the first suit,
but not where any additional palties were involved.
This result is in line with the generally accepted rule of privity
and mutuality in the doctrine of res judicata,- namely, that only
parties to the former judgment or their privies may take advan-
tage of or be bound by it, and that the estoppel or bar of the judg-
ment must operate mutually.3 A privy within this rule must be
one who claims an interest in the subject-matter affected by the
judgment through or under one of the parties, i.e., either by in-
heritance, succession or purchase; and this interest must have
been acquired after the rendition of the judgment.- The estoppel
or bar of the judgnient operates mutually if the one taking advan-
tage of it would have been bound by it, had it gone the other way.6
These twvo concepts, privity and mutuality, are of ancient origin,
being found in the Year Books" and in the Roman law.' No
Cromwell v. County of Sac (1876) 94 U. S. 351; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Commissioners (1902, C. C. A. 8th) 117 Fed. 82. But a former judgment
determines the existence or non-existence of a right of action as well as
the subsidiary points essential to it; and since the judgment is res judicata
as to all points actually decided by it, there seems to be no difference
between its operation as a "bar" and as an "estoppel". It will "bar" the
second suit whenever a point determined by it is decisive of the second suit.
2 But it may be out of harmony with the &leading rule as to splitting
causes of action. Under this rule a plaintiff is required to ask for all the
relief then due him on the one cause of action. If he sues his adversary
piecemeal the first adjudication will bar all the other suits. Bolen Coal
Co. v. Whittaker Brick Co. (1894) 52 Kan. 747, 35 Pac. 810; Williams-
Abbott Electric Co. v. Model Electric Co. (1907) 134 Iowa, 665, 112 N. W.
181; 1 Van Fleet, Former Adjudication (1895) 204. The breach of the
defendant's promise made for the benefit of the various makers of the
six notes may be considered as a single cause of action giving rise to
separate remedial rights, or rights of action, in the various sets of co-
makers. Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALB LAW JOURNAL,
817, 829. On this analysis it might have been held that the suits in which
all the plaintiffs were among the plaihtiffs in the first suit were barred.
Of course if each set of co-makers is thought to have a separate cause of
action there was no splitting. Cf. Williams & Co. v. Kitchen (1890) 40
Mo. App. 604; Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co. (1902) 170 N. Y. 40,
62 N. E. 772; Capitob City Ins. Co. v. Jones (1900) 128 Ala. 361, 30 So.
674.
3 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Co. (1912) 225 U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641;
2 Black, Judgments (1891) 652, 653.
4 Womach v. City of St. Joseph (1907) 201 Mo. 467, 100 S. W. 443;
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Co., supra note 3; 2 Black, op. cit. supra note 3, at
654; Chand, A Treatise on the Law of Res Judicata (1894) 184.
5 Goodnow v. Litchfield (1884) 63 Iowa, 275, 19 N. W. 226; State cx
rel. First Nat. Bank v. Hastings (1922) 120 Wash. 283, 207 Pac. 23;
1 Van Fleet, op. cit. supra note 2, at 110.
G (1479) Y. B. 18 Edw. IV, 1, pl. 4; 3 Co. Litt.* 352, a.
7 Chand, op. cit. supra note 4, at 183; 2 Black, op. cit. supra note 3, at
601.
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satisfactory explanation for their use has been discovered other
than some supposed and unprovable principle of "natural" fair-
ness. The following case will illustrate. Suppose that A had
title to land over which P claimed an easement. A refused to let
P come on the land and P sued for damages and obtained judg-
ment on the ground that he had an easement. A then conveyed
to B. B would be bound by that judgment if he sued P for
trespass or if he interfered with P's entry and P sued him.,
Similarly, if A had gained the first judgment, B could tahe
advantage of it if he sued P or if P sued him.2 These results
seem satisfactory; and it will be observed that both privity and
mutuality exist.10 Whether both of these elements are necessary
to res judicata can be determined only by examining other types
of cases.
In approaching this problem certain cases discuss neither
privity nor mutuality, being content to raise only two questions,
one factual and one functional. (1) Has the identical issue already
been decided on the merits? (2) Is the party to be adversely
bound by the former judgment unfairly prejudiced thereby? "1
These are cases of tort and contract, not involving a transfer of
property. For example, in an action against a master for injuries
8 Ahlers v. Thomas (1899) 24 Nev. 407, 56 Pac. 93; City of Ncv, York
-.. New York City Ry. (1908) 193 N. Y. 543, 86 N. E. 565.
1 Smith v. Kiene (1910) 231 Blo. 215, 132 S. W. 1052; Villagc of Wyao r-
ing v. Ohio Traction Co. (1922). 104 Ohio St. 325, 135 N. E. G75.
10 Since by the law of property the successor to the subject-matter
affected by the former judgment can obtain with respect thereto only such
legal relations as his transferor possessed, a judgment that certain legal
relations did, or did not, exist in the transferor determines whether or not
they now exist in the transferee or successor taking after the judgment.
2 Black, op. cit. sazpra note 3, at 654. As a corollary to this it was said,
"As a successor is entitled to the benefit of a judgment in favor of the
person under whom he claims, a judgment against the latter may viec
versa. be opposed to the former". Chand, op. cit. supra note 4, at 185.
From such reasoning it was but a step to say that no one could take advan-
tage of a judgment who would not be bound by it, had it gone the otiter way.
11 "The question of who is conclud~d by a judgment has been obscured
by the use of the words 'privity' and 'privies', . . . the true reason
for holding the issue res judicata does not necessarily depend on privity,
but on the policy of the law to end litigation by preventing a party who
has had one fair trial on a question of fact from again drawing it into
controversy." Taylor v. Sartorions (1908) 130 Mo. App. 23, 40, 103
S. W. 1089, 1094; cf. Sargent v. Noew Harca Stcamboat Co. (1894) 65
Conn. 116, 126, 31 At. 543, 547. As to mutuality, Bentham hao said,
"If the rule itself is a curious one, the reason given for it is still more so:-
'Nobody can take benefit by a verdict, who had not been prejudiced by it,
had it gone contrary': a maxim which one would suppose to have found its
way from the gaming-table to the bench. If a party be bcnefitel by one
throw of the dice he will, if the rules of fair play are obzerved, be prejudice!
by another: but that the consequence should hold when applied to ju tice is
not equally clear." 7 Bentham's Works (Bowring's ed. 18.!3) 171.
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caused by the negligence of his servant, a judgment against the
plaintiff, on the ground that the servant was not negligent, is
conclusive, as to the servant's negligence, in a subsequent action
brought by the same plaintiff against the servant.12  But a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the master, based on
negligence in the servant, is not binding on the servant, should
he be subsequently sued by the same plaintiff.13 A master and
servant are not in privity as previously defined ;14 and a defendant
can take advantage of a judgment and yet not be bound by it.
It thus appears that in cases of master and servant the doctrine of
res judicata is applied without any dependence upon either privity
or mutuality. The same has been true in other cases where there
was responsibility over or secondary responsibility, as in the
principal and surety relation. These cases appear to establish
the rule, that one who has had his day in court and has lost,
cannot reopen identical issues by merely switching adversaries,",
and that he cannot take advantage of a judgment in his favor
against an adversary who has had no day in court.17
In other types of cases, however, where neither privity nor
secondary responsibility existed, the courts have continued to
retry identical issues in spite of the' fact that the one against
whom the former judgment was invoked had had his day in court
on those issues. For example, a child, by his next friend, re-
covered for injuries received at the hands of the defendant. This
judgment was held not to be conclusive of the defendant's responsi-
12 Lasher v. McAdam (1925, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 125 Misc. 95, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (judgment in favor of master barred action against servant);
Hill v. Bain (1885) 15 R. I. 75, 23 AtI. 44 (judgment for agent may be
taken advantage of by prirfcipal in action brought by same plaintiff);
contra: State Bank v. Robinson. (1853) 13 Ark. 214.
13 Rookard v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. (1909) 84 S. C. 190, 65 S. E.
1047 (judgment against agent, not conclusive against principal); Carey v.
Conn (1923) 107 Ohio St. 113, 140 N. E. 643 (judgment against principal,
not conclusive against agent).
14 Compare Beach v. Milford Ice Co. (1913) 87 Conn. 528, 89 At. 181.
15 Cressler v. Brown (1920) 79 Okla. 170, 192 Pac. 417 (judgment for
principal may be taken advantage of by surety); see Benjamin v. Ver
Nooy (1899, 3d Dept.) 36 App. Div. 581, 55 N. Y. Supp. 796 (judgment
against surety, not conclusive against principal); cf. Lumberman's Mut.
Gas. Co. v. Bissell (1922) 220 Mich. 352, 190 N. W. 283 (indemnitor-in-
demnitee relation). Many cases hold that a judgment against the princi-
pal is not even admissible as evidence in a suit against the surety. See
Ames, Cases on Suretyship (1901) 142, note.
16 "He has had his day in court and it is immaterial whether he has
chosen to test his right as against the principal or the agent in the
transaction, provided the issue to be tried was identical as against both".
Emma Silver Min. Co. v. Emma Silver Min. Co. of N. Y. (1880, C. C. S. D.
N. Y.) 7 Fed. 401, 408; Eissing Chemical Co. v. Peoples Nat. Bank (1923,
2d Dept.) 205 App. Div. 89, 199 N. Y. Supp. 342.
17 Logan v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. (1909) 82 S. C. 518, 64 S. E. 515.
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bility for the same injuries in an action by the child's father for
loss of services, because no privity, as previously defined, existed
between father and childY In another case'0 the defendant gave
four notes in payment for a threshing machine. The plaintiff
(payee) assigned one of them to X. All four notes being due, X
sued and recovered. The plaintiff then sued on the other three
notes, but was not permitted to use the former judgment against
the defendant to establish the defendant's general responsibility
under the contract of sale, because the plaintiff was not in privity
with X. This case is very similar to the instant case, in which
the various third-party beneficiaries sued on the same promise
and a judgment in favor of one set of third-party beneficiaries
was not allowed to operate against the same defendant in favor
of another set of third-party beneficiaries, because privity did
not exist between them. In all these cases the former judgment
against the defendant necessarily involved issues identical with
those in the subsequent suit against him. Having had an oppor-
tunity to make his defense he would not be unfairly prejudiced
by being forced to abide by the result, and there seems to be no
reason for giving him a second chance to defend.
A consideration of the foregoing suggests a rule governing the
application of res judicata. Assuming an identity of issue and
a judgment on the merits, the only requirement should be that
the one against whom the former judgment is invoked was ..
party, or a privy of a party, to it. The relationship between
the one involdng the former judgment and the parties to the
previous litigation is immaterial, and mutuality should be entirely
disregarded.
2'
This suggested rule may be tested by applying it to an e.:treme
case. One hundred and ninety-three purchasers of stock, having
'$ Wilton v. Middlesex R. R. (1878) 125 Mass. 130; Hooper -e. Sozutlecr
Ry. (1900) 112 Ga. 96, 37 S. E. 165; cf. Frecman v. Hari-oson (1912, Tex.
Civ. App.) 143 S. W. 686; Scott r. Hartog (1912, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 75
Mlisc. 126, 132 N. Y. Supp. 846.
i McDonald & Co. v. Gregory (1875) 41 Iowa, 513; Johnzroje v. Unzion
Switch & Signal Co. (1S91, Super. Ct.) 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 876, 13 N. Y.
Supp. 612.
") This rule has been previously suggested and ably argued in Co., Rcj
Adjhdicata: Wlo Entitled to Plead (1923) 9 VA L. RzG. (xz. s.) 2 9. Se-
ibid. 252, for quotation from oral opinion of Groner, J., as talzen down by
stenographer of court, in Du Pont Co. v. Richmond Co. (1923, U. S. Dist.
Ct., Richmond, Va.). See United States v. Wexlcr (1925, E. D. N. Y.) 8
Fed. (2d) 880 (judgment in divorce case that defendant had committed
adultery was conclusive against him in suit by United States to vacate a
certificate of naturalization).
21 In other fields of law mutuality has been disregarded. See 2 Wig-
more, Evidence (1st ed. 1904) 1735; and Zellekcn v. Lynch (1909) so
Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563; Epstein v. Gluchin (1922) 233 N. Y. 490, 135
N.E. 861 (mutuality in specific performance of contracts disregarded).
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been induced to purchase by a fraudulent prospectus, were allowed
to join in an action against the promoters of the corporation. -2
Suppose each had sued separately on his own right of action.
Under the suggested rule, if the first plaintiff or any number of
plaintiffs sued and lost, the defendant could take no advantage
therefrom against other plaintiffs who had had no day in court,
whereas whenever any plaintiff should win, all common questions
of law and fact would be conclusively determined against the
defendant in favor of all other plaintiffs whose rights of action
werecyet untried. It may be argued that this unduly oppresses
the defendant, since in each suit he must defend to the utmost
and always has everything to lose and relatively little to gain.
Should he win the first suit, however, the benefit of the experience
will enable him the more readily to defend the others, and should
he lose, it will be only after a fair opportunity to defend, and he
ought not to complain if he is bound by a judgment against him
on the merits.23  If the New York court sees no injustice in forc-
ing a defendant to fight one hundred and ninety-three plaintiffs
at once, with all staked upon the issue, there would seem to be
none in forcing a party to stake all upon one fair litigation where
he has only a single opponent. In addition, there is a consider-
able public advantage in the reduction of litigation.
THE EFFECT OF THE AGNELLO CASE ON "INCIDENTAL"
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The attempt *of a defendant to have evidence obtained on an
alleged "unreasonable" search and seizure excluded is of fre-
quent occurrence today. Many of the courts hold the fruits of
22 Akely v. Kinnicatt (1924) 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682; COMMENTS
(1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 192. It may be noted that very liberal
joinder of parties is allowed by modern codes, especially in the New York
Code which permits all plaintiffs having claims arising out of the "same
transaction or series of transactions" to join when common questions of
law or fact are involved. N.Y.C.P.A. 1921, sec. 209. It is apparently
immaterial what relation exists between the plaintiffs, so long as identical
issues will arise against the defendant. The doctrine of res judicata
would take a similar step forward under the suggested rule.
23 "Where a party to an action, being fully apprised of his rights, suf-
fers judgment to go against him, when he. might, by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence in making his defense, prevent a recovery of the amount
claimed, . . . he should not be allowed in a subsequent proceeding to
re-agitate questions . . . adjudicated at the former trial." Shelbina
Hotel Assoc. v. Parker (1874) 58 Mo. 327, 329. "There is reason for say-
ing a man shall not lose his cause in consequence of a verdict given in a
former proceeding to which he was not a party; but there is no reason
whatever for saying that he shall not lose his cause in consequence of
a proceeding to which he was a party, merely because his adversary wal
not." 7 Bentham, op. cit. supra note 12, at 171.
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such searches inadmissible,1 thus in effect freeing many guilty
persons. But a search is not necessarily unreasonable within the
Fourth Amendment because made without a warrant, if "inci-
dental to a lawful arrest". It becomes necessary, therefore, to
determine as exactly as possible the scope of the term "inci-
dental".2
The privilege and duty of the police to search a defendant and
the premises wherein he is found when he is arrested is spoken
of as having existed "from time immemorial".- The courts
have justified such action on various grounds: (1) To get evi-
dence with which to prove the charge on which the accused is
I The Supreme Court takes this position in the leading case of Weelks v.
United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341. It cannot be safely
stated that the majority of the State Courts are either in accord with
or opposed to this rule of the federal courts. For a collection and analysis
of the authorities see Atkinson, Prohibition and the Week, 'm.e (1925)
23 MICH. L. REv. 748, 764-774. And in addition see Massantonio v. Pcople
(1925, Colo.) 236 Pac. 1019; State v. Chester (1925, R. I.) 129 Atl. 590.
Nor can it be said th~at this policy of the Supreme Court in upholding the
Constitutional safeguards at the expense of an occasional escape of a
guilty person has met with the universal approval of writers on the
subject. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sees. 2183, 2184; Wigmore,
Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Sciz'swc (1922) 8 A. B. A.
JOR. 479; Nelson, Search and. Scizvrc: Boyd v. United States (1923)
9 A. B. A. JouR. 773; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Ilicgai Scerell
and Seizure (1925) 19 ILL. L. Rrv. 303, 311; Knox, Self-Ine rh!am on
(1925) 74 U. PA. L. REv. 139, passim. For views in support of the
Supreme Court's position in this respect, see Chafee, Freedom of Speech
(1920) 299, et seq.; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizure (1921) 34
HAnv. L. Ruv. 361, passim; Chafee, The Progi'ess of the, Laxw, 1919-1922
(1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 673, 694-704; Freund, Scarches and Scizzrcs
(1924) 56 Cmc. L. NEws 211, 214-15, parshfn; Atkinson, Admdsaibility of
Eviden.ce Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Sciziures (1925)
25 CoL. L. REv. 11, passbn.
2 See Weeks v. United States, scipra note 1, at 392, 34 Sup. Ct. 341; Car-
roll v. United States (1924) 267 U. S. 132, 158, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 27. It
is to be observed that only "unreasonable" searchcs and seizures are for-
bidden in the Fourth Amendment. "The Constitutional expression, 'un-
reasonable searches' is not fixed and absolute in meaning. The meaning.in
some degrees must change with changing social, economic and legal con-
ditions." M3ilam v. United States (1924, C. C. A. 4th) 29 Fed. 029, 631.
"No general rule can be laid down to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment has been violated. Each case must be determined upon its
particular facts and circumstances. . . ." Pen -e. United States (1025,
C. C. A. 8th) 4 Fed. (2d) 881, 883. Cf. Boyd v. United State: (18SO) 110
U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524. For a consideration of the term "unreasonable",
see Atkinson, What is an Unreasonable Search? (1926) 24 MicH. L. Rm-.
277. But see Youman v. Commonwealth (1920) 189 Ky. 152, 159,224 S. W.
860, 863, where it was said that even a "reasonable" search would be im-
proper.
5 Houghton v. Bachman (1866, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T.) 47 Barb. 3S%
392; United States v. Mills (1911, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 185 Fed. 318, 310; cf.
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English La2w (1895) 577, 578.
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held; 4  (2) to prevent his escape;5 (3) to prevent harm by
the use of deadly weapons in his possession ;" and (4) to safe-
guard his property.: But must the property taken bear some
relation to the offense for which the arrest is made? It would
seem that the relation is not essential; at any rate it has been
held that evidence obtained "incidentally to an arrest" may be
used to prove an offense other than the one for which the arrest
was made.8 But where money or other valuables are taken, the
greater number of courts hold that such property must bear
some relation to the offense, fearing lest a contrary rule would
deprive a prisoner of the means of employing counsel.9 Other
4 Spalding v. Preston (1848) 21 Vt. 9 (also to prevent circulation of
counterfeit material); Green v. United States (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 289
Fed. 236; State v. Rebasti (1924) 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858; of. Weeks v.
United States, loc. cit. supra note 2.
' Closson v. Morrison (1867) 47 N. H. 482; Toliver v. State (1923) 133
Mliss. 789, 98 So. 342; Ballou v. Commonwealth (1922) 195 Ky. 722, 243
S. W. 922.
6 Closson v. Morrison, supra note 5; North v. Peoplu (1891) 139 Ill. 81,
28 N. E. 966, The fact that a revolver was taken from a drunken person
was evidently not considered sufficient to sustain the search and seizure in
People v. Beach (1911) 49 Colo. 516, 113 Pac. 513.
7 Connolly v. Thurber Whyland Co. (1893) 92 Ga. 651, 18 S. E. 1004
(prisoner upable to care for his possessions because intoxicated); State v.
Hassan (1910) 149 Iowa, 518, 128 N. W. 960 (property taken for safe-
keeping may be used to prove offense for which arrest is made). It has
been held that where one is arrested while in an automobile, the arresting
officer is under a duty to care for it. Jones v. State, supra note 5; Patrick
v. Commonwealth (1923) 199 Ky. 83, 250 S. W. 507. But where the arrest
was made at night, and the automobile was not in an unsafe place, it was
held that the officer was not responsible for subsequent harm to it, no
request having been made to care for it. It was recognized, however, that
the officer would have been privileged in taking charge of it. Folson v.
Piper (1922) 192 Iowa, 1056, 186 N. W. 28.
s United States v. Murphy (1920, E. D. N. Y.) 264 Fed. 842 (arrest
for intoxication, whiskey found on person used to prove another charge);
Haverstick v. State (1925, Ind.) 147 N. E. 625 (arrest for speeding, liquor
found in incidental search of automobile used to prove another charge).
Cf. -Ballon v. Commonwealth, supra note 5 (incidental search being law-
ful, any information obtained by it was competent evidence for whatever
it could prove). But where officers entered premises lawfully, in search
for drugs, it was held that liquor which was found could not be used to
prove a violation of the prohibition act. United States v. Boyd (1924, W.
D. Wash.) 1 Fed. (2d) 1019; see (1925) 23 MicH. L. REV. 663. This
decision may perhaps be explained on the ground that the search was too
extensive; wholesale seizures at the time of the arrest have been held
improper. United States v. Mills, supra note 3; United States v. Mounday
(1913, D. Kan.) 208 Fed. 186; Flagg v. United States (1916, C. C. A. 2d)
233 Fed. 481; Colyer v. Skefiington (1920, D. Mass.) 265 Fed. 17, 44.
9Ex. parte Craig (1827, C. C. E. D. Pa.) Fed. Cas. No. 3,321; Rex i.
Barnett (1829, Monmouth Assizes) 3 Car. & P. 600; Rex v. Jones (1834,
Reading Assizes) 6 Car. & P. 343; Rex v. O'Donnell (1835, Cent. Crim.
Ct,) 7 Car. & P. 138; Rex v. Burgiss (1836, Oxford Circuit) 7 Car. & P.
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courts, however, permit the money or valuables to be taken on
the ground that the possession thereof may enable the prisoner
to escape.10 Still other cases show that whether or not money
may be taken in these searches is discretionary with the officer."
The principal problem-what searches are "incidental to a
lawful arrest"-may be resolved into two questions for purposes
of analysis: First, must the search and seizure take place exactly
at the time of the arrest? Second, must the extent of the search
be restricted to "the place in which the arrest is made", and if
not, how extensive may the search be?'2 There is an abundance
488; Rex v. Rooney (1836, Shewsbury Assizes) 7 Car. & P. 515; Regina v.
Bass (1849, Stafford Assizes) 2 Car. & K. 822; Rickcrs v. Sineox: (1376)
1 Utah, 33; Hubbard v. Garner (1897) 115 Mich. 400, 73 N. W. 390;
Moreno v. Ago Chi (1909) 12 Phil. Rep. 439; cf. Stuart v. Ha;,1ri (1897)
69 Ill. App. 668; Tones v. State (1905) 48 Ten. Crim. App. 363, 372, 83 S.
W. 217, 221; State v. Robbins (1890) 124 Ind. 308, 311, 24 N. E. 973, 979;
Smith v. Jeroaie (1905, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 47 2\isc. 22, 24, 93 N. Y. Supp.
202, 203; United States v. Wilson (1903, C. C. S. D., N. Y.) 163 Fed. 3J38, 130.
In the following cases money was held not to come within a statute listing
articles which might be taken in an incidental search, and the money in-
volved had no relation to the offense. State v. Cc-tain Appv'rtcnqncs
(1915) 46 Okla. 53S, 149 Pac. 130; Mille" v. State (1915) 4G Ohla. 67,
149 Pac. 364. It has been stated that to permit the officers to take money
not connected with the offense would enable them to strip a defendant of
all his effects when charged only with a trivial misdemeanor. Exs parte
Hurn (1891) 92 Ala. 102, 9 So. 515; 1 Bishop, Ncwv Criminal Proccdnrc
(2d ed. 1913) secs. 210, 211.
10 Closson v. Morrison, supra note 5; Fogg r. Worstcr (1870) 49 N. H.
503; O'Connor v. Bucklin (1379) 59 N. H. 589; Holkcr v. Hcnesscy (1897)
141 Mo. 527, 42 S. W. 1090. The seizure of money has been sustained under
a statute authorizing officers to seize it when it is to be used in evidence.
Robinson v. Inches (1922) 220 Mich. 490, 190 N. W. 227; Comp. Law,
Blich. 1915, sees. 15880-15883.
3.3 State ex rel. Brmuno v. Clausmier (1900) 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541
(may take dangerous weapons or anything else that officer thinks is nec-
essary for public safety or to prevent escape) ; cf. State cx mci. Muerphy v.
Brown (1914) 83 Wash. 100, 105, 145 Pac. 69, 71; Commercial Exchenge
Bank v. McLeod (1885) 65 Iowa, 665, 19 N. W. 329, 22 N. W. 919 (tahing
of money or watch held justifiable where it reasonably appeared that it
might be used to identify the prisoner, notwithstanding that it turned out
that money was not needed as evidence) ; State v. Lyon (1916) 170 Iowa,
171, 157 N. W. 742; State v. Bron.,man (1921) 191 Iowa, 60, 182 N. W.
823 (marked money properly taken from prisoner as evidence); Reif-
snyder v. Lee (1876) 44 Iowa, 101 (watch identified prisoner); Rex V.
Kinsey (1836, Cent. Crim. Ct.) 7 Car. & P. 447 (rape: it did not appear
whether watch might be used for identification, ordered returned). It may
be said, perhaps, that it is incumbent upon the prisoner to show that the
money taken bears no relation to the offense. Regina v. F.rost (1839, Mon-
mouth Spec. Comm.) 9 Car. & P. 129; Walker v. State (1911) 61 Fla. 78,
54 So. 387 (murder: theory of state that robbery was motive).
12 The decisions rarely isolate either of these questions; the division
is made here purely for convenience. As has been noticed in note 1, -upra,
evidence obtained by conduct violating the Fourth Amendment is admis-
sible in a respectable number of the state courts so long as it is relevant
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of authority to the effect that a search of the person of the ac-
cused and of the premises wherein he is found is proper if made
at the time of the arrest. 13 But, although few cases have squarely
raised the issue, it seems that where the search is made subse-
quently to the arrest it will be held improper.14 In indicating the
time within which an officer may make the search it is said: "If
he may thus return and forcibly enter within an hour after the
arrest, a like forcible entry within a month would be equally
justifiable"." Although the soundness of this reasoning is
questionable, the adoption of an arbitrary requirement for the
purpose of avoiding the difficulty of determining what is a
"reasonable" time after the arrest seems, on the whole, justi-
fiable. It is to be noted, however, that a modification of this
and material. The authority of cases on the questions here considered
which come.from those jurisdictions is perhaps weakened, in that evidence
will be admitted even if the search is not "incidental". Cases in which the
broader ground for admissibility is assigned are purposely omitted. See for
example: State v. Pauley (1923, N. D.) 192 N. W. 91; Burks v. State
(1924, Tex. Crim. App.) 260 S. W. 181; State v. Reed (1917) 53 Mont.
292, 163 Pac. 477. The last case presents an interesting question. May
keys to the prisoner's premises obtained on an "incidental" search of his
person be used to obtain other evidence? It was held that letters obtained
by such a subsequent search were admissible. No other case squarely
presenting the question seems to have arisen. But it has been held that a
trunk-check obtained on an incidental search of the person might be used
to obtain a trunk located at a railroad station and the evidence so obtained
would be admissible. United States v. Wilson, supra note 9. And so with
the key to a closed automobile. People v. Garrett (1925, Mich.) 205 N.
W. 95. The authority of the last mentioned case is also weakened so far
as this discussion is concerned because the court relies on Carroll v. United
States, supra note 2. A dissenting opinion declared that only the key
should be admissible.
13 For a comprehensive collection of the authorities, see (1924) 32 A. L.
R. 680, 681-2, note; also Haverstick v. State, supra note 8, at 626-627. In
addition, see Commission & Stock Co. v. Moore (1898) 13 App. D. C. 78;
McDonald v. Weeks (1912) 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 600; United States v. Welch
(1917, S. D. N. Y.) 247 Fed. 239; Donegan v. United States (1922, C. C.
A. 2d) 287 Fed. 641; Lambert v. United States (1922, C. C. A. 9th) 282
Fed. 413; United States v. Camarota (1922, S. D. Calif.) 278 Fed.
388; O'Connor v. United States (1922; D. N. J.) 281 Fed. 396; Green
v. United States, supra. note 4; Laney v. United States (1923, Ct. of
App. D. C.) 294 Fed. 412; Milam v. United States, supra note 2; State
v. George (1924, Wyo.) 231 Pac. 683; Garske v. United States (1924, C.
C. A. 8th) 1 Fed. (2d) 620;.Sayers v. United States (1924, C. C. A. 9th)
2 Fed. (2d) 146; State v. Rebasti, supra note 4; Berg v. State (1925, Okla.
Grim. App.) 233 Pac. 497; State v. Rudy (1925, W. Va.) 127 S. E. 190;
Soderberg v. State (1925, Okla. Crim. App.) 237 Pac. 467; of. State -'.
Graham (1876) 74 N. C. 646, 648; People v. Jakira (1922, Ct. of Gen.
Sess. N. Y. City) 118 Misc. 303, 193 N. Y. Supp. 306.
4 Gamble v. Keyes (1915) 35 S. D. 644, 153 N. W. 888; People v. Manko
(1921, Sup. Ct. Trial T.) 189 N. Y. Supp. 357; cf. People v. Kalvin, (1921,
Bronx Co. Ct.) 189 N. Y. Supp. 359.
Is Gamble v. Keyes, supra note 14, at 650, 153 N. W. at 890.
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requirement was made, in the Oklahoma case of Davis v. State,',
where it was held that if the articles to be used in evidence are
cumbersome or bulky, the officers may return to the place of
the arrest for the purpose of obtaining them. The court was
apparently unconcerned at the introduction of two more elements
of uncertainty-what articles are bulky within this modification,
and how much later the officers are justified in returning for
them.
As to the "place element", actual decisions are again few, -
and the language used will be found to be broader than the deci-
sions. It has been said that a building wherein an arrest is made
may "be searched to the extent that the offender's control and
activities likely extended . . . generally every room may be
searched." 18 The search in that case, however, was confined to
the rooms on the same floor adjacent to the room in which the
arrest took place. It seems that where a court is actually con-
fronted with an extensive search of the premises it will not con-
sider it "incidental". Thus, in a late Michigan case,19 evidence
was held inadmissible where the search was extended from the
place of arrest to the head of an adjacent stairway, the court
saying that the warrant for the arrest gave "lawful access only
to that part of the house which it was necessary for him [the
sheriff] to enter in order to serve his warrant." Recently, in
the decision of Agnzello v. United States (Oct. 1925) 46 Sup. Ct.
4, the Supreme Court of the United States has for the first time
considered the problem in a case where it was directly in issue.
Federal agents watched the defendant go from the building in
which he made his home, to another building some distance away.
They witnessed a sale of narcotics in the latter building, went
in, made an arrest, and then proceeded several city blocks to
the defendant's home, where they made another search. The
court held that the search could not be sustained as "incidental
to the arrest"; and the evidence so obtained was accordingly held
inadmissible.
It is to be observed that this decision in effect affirms the re-
quirement that the search and seizure must take place at the
time of the arrest. Further support for this position may be
found in a still more recent Federal case, Poulos v,. United Statcs
IG (1925, Okla. Crim. App.) 234 Pac. 787.
17people V. 0oia (1914) 180 Mich. 641, 147 N. W. 525 (apparently
searched entire house); People v. Woodnard (1922) 220 BIieh. 511, 190
N. W. 721 (entrance to quell riot; apparently searched throughout houze) ;
People v. Laundy (1922) 103 Or. 443, 204 Pac. 958, 200 Pac. 290; Pcople
v. Conway (1923) 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (I. W. W. papers in plain
view in hall); Argetaks v. State (1923) 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (zearch
of bed room, adjacent to room in which arrest took place, held "incidental").
15 Sayers v. United States, szipra note 13, at 147.
'9 People v. Conway, supra, note 17.
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(1925, C. C. A. 6th) 8 Fed. (2d) 120, where one of the defendants
was arrested in front of the dwelling house which he occupied
jointly with the other defendant, and the latter was arrested in
front of the store operated by both of them. It was held on the
authority of the Agnello case that gearches of these premises
made after the jailing of the prisoners were not "incidental to
the arrests", and that the evidence so obtained was not admissible.
With reference to the "place element", the Agnello case holds
squarely that a search and seizure taking place in a building
other than the one in which the arrest takes place is not "inci-
dental to the arrest", notwithstanding that the activities of the
defendants in both buildings are under the surveillance of the
government's agents.
20
Although both the "time" and "place" elements were present
in the Agnello case, it appears that the court was primarily in-
fluenced by the fact that the search did not take place on the
premises where the arrest was made. Where the search occurs
an "unreasonably" long time after the arrest, there would seem
to be good reasons in policy for invalidating it. The fact that
the search was not made at the time would seem to indicate the
absence of necessity therefor in order to preserve the evidence;
and if the arrest is lawful there will generally be "probable
cause" to support the issuance of a warrant for the later search.
Where the "place" element alone is the basis of a decision,
the reasons for invalidating the search seem less clear. The
accused has by his conduct created a reasonable suspicion of
guilt-else the arrest is unlawful and the problem does not arise.
Public welfare would seem to be best served by privileging offi-
cers to search, at the time an arrest is made, any premises within
a- reasonable distance which the accused has recently occupied,
if the officers have reason to believe that relevant evidence exists
there. Delay may mean the loss of the evidence in cases. where
the defendant is in fact guilty, and thus be the means of defeating
the ends of justice.
THE EXTENT OF THE SUBROGEE'S REMEDY
(Continued from February Issue.)
2. The Compensator 71 under Workmen's Compensation Acts.
The problem of the extent of subrogation arises also under the
Workmen's Compensation Acts in cases where the workman is
injured or killed by the wilful or negligent act of a third party
20 The Government unsuccessfully contended that the "crime was com-
mitted in the presence of the officers not only at . . . the place of the
arrest, but also . . . at the place of the search." Brief on Behalf of
the United States, 14.
17 The term "compensator" will be used herein to indicate the employer
or insurance carrier -whose duty it is to pay compensation under the act.
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not in the employ of the workman's employer. The varying pro-
visions of the acts and the varying interpretations thereof by the
courts have produced a confused mass of decisions," although
with the purpose of the acts in view it would not seem difficult to
work out the legal relations of the parties.
The acts were designed to remedy a very unsatisfactory com-
mon-law situation. Due to the numerous defenses allowed the
employer (e.g., no negligence, contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, and the fellow-servant rule) an injured workman
seldom got a julgment. If he were so fortunate as to win his
case his damages usually would not be received until long after
the need of them had passed and would be likely to be entirely
incommensurable with his standard of living. Unaccustomed to
such a sum he was likely to squander it and be no better off than
before. In place of this state of affairs it was aimed to substitute
a system whereby the workman irrespective of fault would be
assured of medical aid or funeral expenses and his dependents
of support in their accustomed manner after the stoppage of
his wages. 9 In other words it was intended to make industry
bear the expense of injury to laborers just as that of accident to
machinery.20 In accordance with this scheme it was usually pro-
vided that by electing rights under the act an employee relin-
quished his common law right to damages against his employer
for any injury arising out of his employment.21  Consistently he
might have been required to relinquish it against a third party
tort feasor also,22 receiving in lieu thereof the usual compensation;
and the compensator might have been given a right against the
tort feasor for the compensation paid and no more.23  But such
a solution apparently did not seem desirable to the framers of the
acts, since it would change the responsibility of the tort feasor
from the common-law to the statutory variety, although he might
28 These cases are set out in (1922) 19 A. L. R. 766, note; (1923) 27
A. L. R. 493, note; (1925) 37 A. L. R. 838, note.
19 Cf. Sayles v. Foley (1916, R. I.) 96 At. 340.
20 See Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Acc. Bd. (1916) 52 Mlont G,
10, 155 Pac. 268, 270.
2 E.g., Conn. act, part B, sec. 1 [2 Honnold, Workazens Compensation
(1918) 1083]. In this volume the text of all the Workmen's Compensation
Acts is collected.
22 Such is the result of the Washington and Montana statutes as inter-
preted by the supreme courts of those states when the injury occurs at the
plant of the employer. Peet v. Mills (1913) 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 635;
Bruce v. McAdoo (1922) 65 Mlont. 275, 211 Pac. 772. The Washington
court's interpretation has been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court. Northern, Pac. Ry. v. Meese (1916) 239 U. S. 614, 36 Sup. Ct.
223, reversing (1914, C. C. A. 9th) 211 Fed. 254, where the Circuit Court
of Appeals attempted to distinguish the Pect case.
23 This disregards attorneys' fees, which are allowed the subrogee under
some acts; e.g., Blinn. act. sec. 33 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at
1324).
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not be an employer of workmen or an acceptor of the act.21 More-
over, the constitutionality of such a provision might have been
attacked as not allowing the tort feasor his election whether or
not to be bound by the act.22  Consequently the usual provision
reserves to the workman his common-law right of action against
the third party.
26
Reading this provision in the light of the general purpose of
the statutes, the desired result seems clear. The claimant" is
ultimately to receive either his common-law damages or the statu-
tory compensation, according to which proves the greater, but is
not to receive both; in the meantime he is to have the immediate
benefit of the act to minister to his own needs until a judgment
against the third party can be secured and execution had thereon.
The third party is to pay the entire amount of common-law
damages, but no more. The compensator is to provide tempo-
rarilyi for the workman and his dependents, but is in the long
run to lose no more than the excess, if any, of compensation
over common-law damages awardedY.2
But this result is far removed from the results of the cases.
24 Where two or more independent contractors are working on different
parts of the same enterprise it frequently happens that the servant of one
of them is injured by the negligent act of a servant of the other. In such
a case it seems desirable to give the employer of the tort feasor the benefit
of the act. Accordingly some acts provide that where the third party has
accepted the act subrogation against him shall be limited to the compensa-
tion paid. Ill. act, sec. 29 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1118);
Mahowald v. Thompson-Starrett Co. (1916) 134 Minn. 113, 158 N. W. 913,
159 N. W. 565; Taylorville v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. (1922) 301 111.
157, 133 N. E. 720; Bauer v. Rusetos (1923) 306 I1. 602, 138 N. E. 206.
25 See 1 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at 92. The first New York com-
pulsory Workmen's Compensation Act was held unconstitutional. Ives v.
South Buffalo Ry. (1911) 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431. Constitutional
amendments in California, Ohio, and New York permit compulsory com-
pensation acts. See L. R. A. 1917 D, 52. A few states have held com-
pulsory acts valid -under the police power. State v. Clausen (1911) 65
Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101; Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co.
(1911) 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554. Most of the acts are elective; e.g.,
Conn. act, part B, sec. 1-3 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1083, 1084,)
26 E.g., Conn. act, part B, sec. 6 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at
1085) ; N. Y. act, sec. 29 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1441); but
see supra note 22 for the interpretation of the Washington and Montana
acts which omit the provision. It has been held in New York that the
statutory election is unnecessary as a prerequisite to a common law action
against the third party. Lester v. Otis Elevator Co. (1915, Sup. Ct. App.
T.) 90 Misc. 649, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1058.
27 The term "claimant" will be used herein to indicate the person entitled
to compensation or death benefits under the act; i.e., the workman or any
person entitled under the act to sue in his stead in case of his death.
2S Virtually this entire scheme is provided by the Illinois act, see. 29
(2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1118) where the third party has not
accepted the act. For the scheme where he has accepted the act see supra
note 24.
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Some of the acts omit mention of the compensator's right of sub-
rogation. 9  Under such statutes several courts have declared that
a claimant may prosecute both his common-law and statutory
remedies, retaining the fruits of both judgments.'- At least one
state has changed this undesirable rule by an amendment to its
act.1 It has been suggested that when the question arises in
other states subrogation may be allowed on equitable principles
without waiting for remedial legislation.32 In the absence of a
provision requiring the workman to elect whether he will pursue
the common-law or the statutory remedy 3 there seems to be no
reason why he should not be allowed to prosecute both actions,
provided the compensator is protected from payment of more than
29 E.g., West Virginia and formerly New Jersey. See 2 Honnold, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 1619, 1407, for the texts of these acts.
30 Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz (1914) 85 N. J. L. 432, 91 AtL 91 (the
workman's administratrx, having compromised her claim again the tort
feasor, recovered compensation in full); Mercer v,. Ott (1910) 7S W. Va.
629, 89 S. E. 952 (the workman, having recovered against the tort tensor,
received full compensation); Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co. (1917) 79 W.
Va. 669, 92 S. E. 112 (same); Anstin v. Johnson (1918, Te. Civ. App.)
204 S. W. 1181 (the workman after receiving compensation recovered full
common law damages from the tort feasor for his own benefit); Fox .
Dallas Hotel Co. (1922) 111 Tex. 461, 240 S. W. 517 (same).
312 N. J. Comp. Sts., Cum. Supp., 1911-1924, p. 3885 (amending see. 23
of the act of 1911) reduces the amount of compensation obtainable to the
excess of compensation over common law damages. The first Texas act,
part 2, sec. 6 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1579), limited subroga-
tion to the case where the tort feasor is an independent contractor on the
same job. Under this provision the Amstin and Fox cases, supra note 30,
were decided. Under the amended act, part 2, see. 6, allowing subrogation
against all third party tort feasors, it has been held that the compensatcd
employee may recover common law damages from the tort feasor but mu,t
reimburse the compensator for the compensation received. Lancaotcr v.
Hunter (1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 217 S. W. 765.
32 Hardman, The Common Law Right of Sulbrogation under Wori:me.'s
Compensation Acts (1920) 26 W. VA. L. QurT. 133; (1920) 0 VA. L. fE.
(N. s.) 254. The writter suggests the fire-insurance anology discussed s upra
in text, at 486.
33 This clause exists in a number of the acts; e.g., N. Y. act, zec. 11 (2
Honnold, op. cit. szupra note 21, at 1432). Under such acts it is usually held
that an employee who has elected to take compensation cannot sue the
tort feasor. Hanke v. New York Consol. R. R. (1917, 2d Dept.) 181 App.
Div. 53, 168 N. Y. Supp. 234; Pittsbrgh, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Parlcr
(1922) 191 Ind. 686, 132 N. E. 372; Smith -. Pt. Huroan Ga & Elec. Co.
(1922) 217 Mich. 519, 187 N. W. 292; accord: HagerstoWU V. Schrci-ncr
(1920) 135 Bld. 650, 109 AtI. 464 (without an express election-of-remedies
clause); contra: Lancaster v. Hunter, mpra note 31 (in spite of an elec-
tion-of-remedies clause). In Kentucky, although there is no election-of-
remedies clause, the compensated employee's judgment against the tort
feasor is reduced by the amount of the compensation. Book v. Hendcrrn
(1917) 176 Ky. 785, 197 S. W. 449; Williams v. Brown (1924) 205 Ky. 74,
265 S. W. 480.
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the execss, if any, of compensation over damages. This result
has usually been reached.34
Under acts providing for subrogation it would seem that in the
absence of an election-of-remedies clause there should be no doubt
that a compensator who has paid a claimant may recover from
the tort feasor the entire amount of common-law damages, hold-
ing any excess above compensation in trust for the workman or
his dependants; but as a matter of fact the cases show a square
conflict on the point, regardless of whether the election clause
is present or not.35 One court in holding that subrogation must
34 Thus where there is no election-of-remedies clause it is usually held
that the compensated claimant may recover full damages from the tort
feasor, holding a sum equal to the compensation for the compensator.
Genes v. Fisher (1919) 286 Ill. 606, 122 N. E. 95, discussed in (1919) 28
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 715; Black v. Chicago Gt. W. R. R. (1919) 187 Iowa,
904, 174 N. W. 774; Muncaster v. Graham Ice Cream Co. (1919) .103 Neb.
379, 172 N. W. 52; O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. (1922) 305 Ill. 244, 137 N.
E. 214; Lowe v. Morgan's La. T. R. & S. S. Co. (1922) 150 La. 29, 90 So.
429; Lengle v. North Lebanon Tp. (1922) 274 Pa. 51, 117 At. 403 (ap-
parently, though there is no express statement that the compensation must
be refunded). In Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co. v. Chartrand (1924) 239 N. Y.
36, 145 N. E. 274, a workman, compensated by the insurance carrier under
the New Jersey act, recovered a greater amount in New York from the
tort feasor, who paid the judgment in spite of notice by the carrier. At
suit of the carrier a lien was decreed on the proceeds of the judgment.
The case is favorably discussed in (1925) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 441;
(1925) 25 CoL. L. R.v. 383; NOTES AND COMMENT (1925) 10 CON. L.
QUART. 364, 366.
35 In the following cases the compensator, having paid compensation in
whole or in part, recovered the whole amount of common law damages
against the tort feasor. Casualty Co. of Am. 1). Swett Elec. Lt. & Power
Co. (1916, 4th Dept.) 174 App. Div. 825, 162 N. Y. Supp. 107 (with a
dictum that any possible surplus might be held as a trust fund for the
workman or his dependents); Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller (1917, C. C. A.
8th) 240 Fed. 376 [the surplus being paid to the workman's dependents
under the express provision of the Nebraska act, see. 18 (2 Honnold, op.
cit. supra note 21, at 1372)]; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Variety Iron & Steel
Co. (1921) 139 Md. 313, 115 Atl. 59 [under Md. act, sec. 58 (2 Honnold,
op. cit. supra note 21, at 1257) provision similar to that of Nebraska act];
Royal Ind. Co. v. White Eng. Corp. (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 120 Misc.
332, 198 N. Y. Supp. 264 (repeating dictum of Swett case, supra); Mary.
land Cas. Co. v. Union Bridge Elec. Mfg. Cd. (1924) 145 Md. 644, 125 At. 762.
In the following cases subrogation was limited to the amount of compensa-
tion awarded. United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Now Ydrk Rys. (1916,
Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dept.) 93 Misc. 118, 156 N. Y. Supp. 615; Grand
Rapids Lumber Co. v. Blair (1916) 190 Mich. 518, 157 N. W. 29 (subroga-
tion to extent of employer's damages, compensation paid being prima facie
evidence of such); Albrecht Co. v. Whitehead Iron Wks. (1918) 200 Mich.
109, 166 N. W. 855; Metropolitan Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry. (1921)
149 Minn. 181, 183 N. W. 830 [by express provision of act, sec. 33 (2 Hon-
nold, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1324)]; Ridley v. United Sash & Door Co.
(1924) 98 Okla. 80, 224 Pac. 351 (although employer re-assigned his right
of action to workman). Of the above acts the following only require the
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be limited to compensation has placed its decision squarely on the
ground of the election clause, declaring that to allow an employer
to recover a greater amount would either enable him to speculate
on the misfortunes of his employees or, if the surplus be held for
the workman, allow the latter two inconsistent remedies contrary
to the spirit of the statute.21 This result seems unsound. It is
submitted that the election-of-remedies clause was inserted not
to limit the claimant's recovery to the chosen remedy though it
prove to be the less lucrative of the two, but to prevent undue
complication of litigation such as occurs when a compensator,
having paid an insolvent claimant, must in order to protect him-
self get a lien adjudged him on the claimant's judgment against
the tort feasor.
3 7
Although at common law subrogation is allowed to a surety
only when he has paid the principal debt in full,- such a rule
would be manifestly unfair under the compensation acts, since
the compensation awarded is usually to be paid in small install-
ments over a considerable period of time. Accordingly the com-
mon-law rule has not been applied to this statutory situation;
the compensator has been allowed to recover against the tort
feasor as soon as the award of compensation is made, although
installments remain to be paid.3 But, since in some cases the
amount of future payments may be very uncertain,10 there may be
employee to elect his remedy: Mich., part 3, see. 15 (2 Honnold, op. cit.
supra. note 21, at 1299); New York, sec. 29 (2 Honnold, op. cit. s upra note
21, at 1441); Okla., art. 2, sec. 18 (2 Honnold, op. cit. supra note 21, at
1512).
-6 Albrecht Co. v. Whitehead Iron Wks., supra note 35.
7 Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Chartrand, supra note 34. If the compen-
sation awarded exceeds the common-law damages, subrogation must of
course be limited to the smaller amount. Thus, in Georgia Cas. Co. v. Hay-
good (1923) 210 Ala. 56, 97 So. 87, where a workman recovered from the
tort feasor damages less than the compensation awarded, the employer re-
covered from the workman the entire amount of this judgment, not sub-
tracting the attorney's fee. Under a statute requiring election of remedies,
if the workman elects to sue the tort feasor, prima facie the question of
subrogation cannot arise. But, if the damages recovered should be less
than the compensation which might have been received, might not the work-
man recover the difference between compensation and damages from the
employer? The case apparently has not arisen. It has been held that
after the workman, electing the common-law remedy, has recovered damages,
the employer cannot recover from the third party his expenditures for the
employee's medical attention. Bossert v. Piel (1920, Sup. Ct. App. T.) 112
Mlisc. 117, 182 N. Y. Supp. 620. Blight he not recover them from the em-
ployee?
f Musgrave v. Dickson (1896) 172 Pa. 629, 33 At1. 705.
9 Casualty Co. of Am. v. Swett Elec. Lt. & Power Co., supra note 35;
Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller, supra, note 35; Metropolitan Mill; Co. v. Miz-
neapolis St. Ry., supra, note 35; Bauer -v. Rusetos, supra note 24; Royal
rnd. Co. v. White Eng. Corp., supra, note 35; Wabash Water & Lt. Co. v.
Home Tel. Co. (1923) 79 Ind. App. 395, 138 N. E. 692.
40 For example, under the New York act, sec. 16 (2 Honnold, op. cit.
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difficulty in calculating the measure of the compensator's recovery
where his subrogation is limited to the amount of compensation,
and in determining what is the surplus to be paid to the claimant
where subrogation. in the entire amount of common-law damages
is allowed. As a consequence New York, in Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co.,41 has adopted a very peculiar rule,
allowing the insurance carrier who has paid part only of the
awarded compensation to recover the full amount of common-law
damages and retain the entire amount of the judgment. In this
decision the court stated42 that in view of the uncertainty of the
amount of future compensation to be paid the dependents of the
deceased workman, the damages assessed probably measured the
carrier's loss as well as any sum which could then be estimated.
A better solution would seem to be to give the workman or his
dependents immediately the excess of damages over compensa-
tion already paid. If he or they be deemed incompetent to re-
ceive such a sum 43 it could be made a trust fund out of which the
allowed compensation could be paid as dueL44 If the fund should
prove insufficient the carrier would have to make up the balance.
If it should prove more than enough the surplus would go to the
workman or his representative. Although the court refused to
create such a trust 45 because it was not provided in the act, it is
submitted that it might have been constructed on equitable prin-
ciples without the aid of the statute which will now be necessary
to accomplish this result.
supra note 21, at 1435) the widow of a deceased workman may die or re-
marry, terminating payments to her; under sec. 22 (2 Honnold, op. Cit.
supra note 21, at 1438) the amount of compensation may be increased or
decreased after the initial award is made.
41 (1925) 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E. 377.
42At 278, 146 N. E. at 378.
43 Cf. the purposes of the acts discussed in the text, at 619.
44 The court discussed suggestions to this effect in decisions of lower
courts of the state. See Casualty Co. of Am. v. Swett Rleo. Lt. & Power
Co., supra note 35 at 829, 162 N. Y. Supp. at 110; Royal Ind. Co. v. White
Nng. Corp., supra, note 35 at 337, 198 N. Y. Supp. at 269.
45 At 276, 146 N. E. at 378.
